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Abstract: Lobbying by businesses is a practice that has become increasingly widespread today, but hardly 
studied in Europe. This paper endeavours to determine whether corporate political operations differ 
significantly from one country to the other. To address this question in Europe, lobbying by French and UK 
firms is analysed by creating a database from a number of the biggest financial newspapers in both countries 
over the last years. Multivariate data analysis techniques are used to model corporate political actions in 
France and the UK. Our results suggest that there is only a few lobbying practices. Three types of lobbying 
practices can indeed be found in France as well as in the UK. This could suggest that firms’ reaction to their 
political environment is less determined by  country specific factors, although national specifics exist,  than by 
the particular problem try to address.. 
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The word “lobbying” originally comes from General Grant who had lived for a while in a hotel after 
the White House had burst into fire. At that time, pressure groups would gather in the lobby of the hotel to 
pressure him (Décaudin, 1997). In this paper, lobbying is defined as those political actions of firms that are 
meant to influence public decisions including, inter alia, laws, regulations or other things (Farnel, 1994).  
Nowadays, a new strategic environment has emerged that has strengthened the need for lobbying : 
business globalisation, the European construction (Jean, 1992) and the increasing power of local actors. All 
these factors are conducive to more competition between firms and more regulation from public decision 
makers.  
Against this background, the study of European firms political actions over the last years is of pressing 
interest. Two countries with opposite traditions regarding lobbying legitimacy, the UK and France, are 
analysed. In the UK, lobbying is a regular device used by firms and openly resorted to while, in France, it is a 
fairly new tool whose legitimacy is, so far, not this well established. Indeed, in the UK, the Crown by tradition  
is supposed to hear the views of all members of the society. That is why, lobbyists are legally heard by the 
Commons. Forty cabinets of lobbying operate in London and are managed by MPs or journalists. MPs are 
allowed to be employed by those cabinets. Conversely, the Le Chapelier law of 1791 used to forbid lobbying in 
France until 1884, when a new law was passed in Parliament. Nowadays, a number of firms specialized in 
lobbying exist but they are neither well known nor well regarded. 
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows: 
the first section presents a taxonomy of corporate political actions; 
the second section describe the database of political actions in France and Britain that has been created; 
the third section identifies two models of corporate political action in France and the UK, compares 









































8The taxonomy of lobbying : a theoretical construct 
 
A taxonomy of firms lobbying operations is first presented which will be used to describe, in the 
second section, French and British corporate political actions and to model their lobbying behaviour in the third 
section. 
 
Existing lobbying taxonomies 
 
          Taxonomies on corporate political actions have already been outlined in the United States. 
Oberman (1993) presents them and concludes that they do not define clearly the underlying corporate political 
strategies. 
Some taxonomies classify corporate political actions using as a sole classification criterion the 
modalities used by the firm to influence its target. Parsons (1969) and McMillan (1978) have worked on such 
taxonomies. These studies however do not analyse  global political strategies.  
Conversely, other studies are too global and lack precision to describe fully lobbying actions. For 
example, Handler & Mulkern (1982) have worked on financial contributions of political action committees in 
the United States. They partition these actions in two models : “ideological” actions and “pragmatic” actions. 
Likewise, Yoffie (1987) comes up with five global corporate political strategies :  the “free rider”, the 
“follower”, the “private goods”, the “leader” and the “entrepreneur” strategies. Both studies have a point in 
common: they use a general strategic vocabulary  without investigating the specificity of the political market. 
    Against this backdrop, this paper tries to build a new taxonomy of corporate political actions based 
on existing taxonomies. The main reference will be the study of Epstein (1969) that defines five descriptive 
variables for lobbying : goals, actors, resources, management and tactics. This paper will use these variables but 















































These four characteristics are essentially useful to describe the data sample.  
Size.  This paper chooses the standard weighing of firms according to their turnover. Other classifications 
include the number of employees but these figures can differ from one country to the other according to 
different regulations. This paper break downs  the turnover of firms in ten levels following the INSEE standard. 
Legal status. This variable has not exactly the same signification in each country and it is difficult to compare 
the status of French and UK firms. Nevertheless, it is useful to describe the sample in each country. For 
example, it can be assumed that a limited liability firm will not have the same type of political action than an 
unlimited liability company according to the different levels of liability of owners.  
Industrial branch. Schmalensee (1985) has shown that the industrial branch can explain a fraction of corporate 
performance.  The analysis of the industrial activity of firms is based on national classification systems in 
France and the UK. They have common levels and both  are in line with the FTSE Global Classification system. 
This international system provides a clear structure for cross-country sectoral analysis. This paper breaks down 
this classification in 17 levels plus one specific level for “Holdings”.  
Listing of the firm on stock markets. This variable is linked to the legal status of the firm. It is used to 
investigate whether the type of corporate governance influences lobbying.  
 
General stance of the firm regarding lobbying 
 
General behaviour towards public decision makers. According to Miles et Snow (1978), firms can pay attention 
to their strategic environment in various ways : they can have a “prospective” behaviour, which means that they 
act before the evolution of the environment; they can have a “defensive” behaviour which means that they act 
only after a modification of the environment  ; they can have a mixed behaviour. Demil (1998) has applied this 
classification to corporate political actions to investigate whether this impacts results positively. In this paper, 
we use this classification as well with different names which are more suitable for lobbying: “active”, if 
lobbying is done to trigger the public decision (according to the “prospective way”) ; “anticipating” if the public 
decision is already under way but the firm can still influence it (according to the “mixed way”) ; “passive” if the 
public decision has already been taken (according to the “defensive way”). 
Frequency of relations with public decision makers. There are two strategies: on based on long run committed 
cooperation with public decision makers (“continuous” relations) or contacts on a case by case basis when 









































8climate between lobbyists and public decision makers.  Furthermore, lobbyists have time to learn the best 
practices to influence political action. Nevertheless continuous relations are more costly (financial, 
organisational, etc.) than case by case relations.  
 
The political action studied 
 
 Causes triggering the lobbying action. Getz (1993) classifies the goals of lobbying in four categories : social, 
economic, political and technical issues. This classification is difficult to apply here, but this paper is aware that 
each firm has different reasons to lobby. Usually, the relevance of the problem is specific to the lobbyist firm or 
to a group of firms. But, occasionally, the lobbyist may argue that questions of public relevance have to been 
solved (for example, environmental or employment issues). Furthermore, firms can expect different results from 
the political action : some want to minimize a loss if the public decision can be opposed to the firm’s interest; 
other firms want to maximize a gain if the public decision can be positive to the firm’s interest. Lastly, 
corporate political strategies can be focused on a single issue or, conversely, on a number of problems 
simultaneously.  
The lobbyists in practice. First, the lobbying firm can have partners for its political action or act alone. 
Collective action has advantages such as a greater weight in negotiations with public decisions makers, 
economies of scale and efficiency. It has more legitimacy if it is a structured organization such as an industrial 
branch union. Nevertheless, collective action entails costs, namely: lack of autonomy in decisions, costs of 
controlling the behaviour of other firms in the union, etc. For instance, McLaughlin, Jordan & Maloney (1993) 
have shown that the size of pressure groups could contribute to explain the results of their lobbying and that 
there is an optimal size for the pressure group. Moreover, this paper distinguishes whether the lobbyist in 
practice is internal to the firm (such as the “public affairs” directorate studied in France by Attarca, 1998) or 
external to the firm (such as specialised consultancies studied by Lamarque, 1996). The current issue is to 
balance profits and losses of these two solutions. For example, an external lobbyist is more experienced but can 
originate agency theory-related problems (developed by Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
The lobbying target. Public decision makers who are targeted are obviously at the core of the description of 
corporate political actions. Getz (1993) found 48 types of targets according to four main dimensions : whether 
public decision makers are elected, the localisation of the target (international, national, regional, local), the 
political level of the target (executive power, legislative power, judicial power), the links between the target and 









































8the political level of the target (instead of the judicial level, this paper will consider consultative level such as 
“autorités administratives indépendantes”) and the localisation of the target (this paper will not consider the 
regional level but adds a European level). Furthermore, this paper will take into account to the type of decisions 
made by the target: be they regulation decisions which a high level of enforcement, such as laws or mere 
decisions of control authorities (such as those of “autorités administratives indépendantes”). 
The management of lobbying. Corrado (1984) has built a taxonomy thereof along different variables : the 
communication with the target that can be direct  (e.g. a meeting) or not, the modalities used to influence the 
target (relationships, financial), whether the action is legal or not. This paper will only  use the first two 
variables because it is difficult to obtain information  about illegal practices. Turning to the modalities used to 
influence the target, this paper adds a third one : the legal modality (e.g. a firm can sue a public decision). 
Moreover, this paper will take account of the length of the corporate political action which can be short or long. 
Eventually, this paper, based on Jacomet’s classification of corporate political actions (2000) underlines the 
attitude of the lobbyist firm to the target which can be pressing (if the lobbyist has a real bargaining power) or 
cooperative (if this is not the case).  


















































Size  10 levels of turnover 
Legal status  Particular to each country 
Industrial branch  17 levels 
General characteristics 
of the firm 
Listing on stock markets  Yes, 
No 





General stance of the 
firm regarding 
lobbying 
  Frequency of relations with 
public decision makers 
Continuous, 
Case by case 
The relevance of the problem  Private, 
Public 
The expected result  Maximise a gain, 
Minimise a loss 
Causes triggering the 
lobbying action 




The type of  partnership for the 
lobbying action 
Individual action, 
Collective and structured action, 
Collective but non -structured action 
The  lobbyists in 
practice 















The lobbying target 
The decision level of the target  General, 
Particular 
The length of the action  Short, 
Long 










The management of  
lobbying 













































8The lobbying networks studied in France and Britain: description of the data sample 
 
The data sample of corporate political actions related to lobbying has been created by reading  the 
biggest financial newspapers in France and the UK, namely : La Tribune and Les Echos in France, the Financial 
Times in the UK. In each country, this paper only took into account the lobbying of firms with a French or a 
British parent company.  
It turns out that there is less corporate political actions described per year in newspapers in France than 
in the UK. For example, in 2000, 169 lobbying actions initiated by British firms were found but only 47 by 
French firms. To have more comparable data samples in terms of degrees of freedom, this paper studies the case 
of France from 1995 to 2000 (resulting in 510 corporate political actions) and of the UK only in 2000 (leading 




The French and British samples exhibit roughly similar characteristics. 
First, very large companies dominate the samples since about 50 percent of lobbyist firms  have a 
turnover above 100 000 GB Pounds. 40 percent of the remainder companies are still fairly large firms (with a 
turnover above 1000 GBP).  
Second, manufacturing firms dominate with a share of 30 percent of both samples. This branch spans 
from agricultural-related industries to electronics.  
Third, the firms of the sample are not listed on stock markets in most cases. Nevertheless, there is a 
difference here between the two samples : British companies are quoted more often tan French companies (a 
third for the UK against a quarter for France).  
Finally, it is difficult to compare the legal status of French and British firms. In France, 75 percent of 










































8General stance towards lobbying 
 
In the same way, usual corporate strategies are mainly common for French and British samples.  
More than 50 percent of firms have an “anticipating”  behaviour towards public decision makers. The 
remainder is more or less equally distributed between the active and passive stances. 
Furthermore, in both samples continuous relations and case by case relations with public decision 
makers are equally distributed. 
 
Causes triggering the lobbying action 
 
About 75 percent of firms lobby to solve a private problem in both countries. One could expect such a 
result since a political action is a costly process. Both in France and the UK, about half of corporate political 
actions are triggered to reduce a loss and half to maximise a gain. Finally, in most cases, there is a single issue 
for one political action, while 30 percent of individuals have multiple objectives.  
 With regard to the lobbyists in practice, the target of lobbying and the management of lobbying, the 
main results are the following.  
In most cases the lobbyists are collective and structured organizations (more than 75 percent in both 
samples). Nevertheless, notice that individual actions are more developed in the UK (13 percent of the sample) 
than in France (6.3 percent of the sample). By contrast, the externalisation choice of the lobbyist differs as 80 
percent of French corporate political actions are operated inside the firm whereas lobbying is mainly done 
outside British firms (two-thirds). This could be the consequence of a more transparent attitude towards 
lobbying in the British legal system. 
Regarding the target of lobbying, there are still a number of differences between the two countries. 
First, the political level of the target is the executive power for more than 90percent of British firms and  
amounts to only 61.3percent for French individuals. A caveat applies to these figures : they do not mean that the 
legislative power is not targeted by UK firms. It could be even the opposite: for example, formal relationships 
between British MPs and companies exist and are not reported in the newspapers used to create the database. 
Second, targets for French actions are mainly national (about 75 percent) and less European (12.4 percent) 









































8in the UK. The decision level of the target is partitioned in both samples into 2/3 for the regulation authorities 
and 1/3 for the control authorities.  
Eventually, the management of the lobbying differs between the French firms to the British firms with 
regard to the length of the action and the attitude to the target but the modalities used to influence the target and 
the communication with the target are the same. Most British firms operate lengthy actions (2/3) whereas this is 
the case of less than half of French firms. The attitude to the target is mainly cooperative in the UK and pressing 
in France. It may be a cultural point. In both samples, the corporate political action is managed mainly 
indirectly and by relationships. 
 
Table 2. A comparison between the French sample and the UK sample 
Points in common  Differences 
- Size 
-  Industrial branch 
- General stance of the firm regarding 
lobbying 
- Causes triggering the lobbying action 
- The type of partnership for the lobbying 
action 
- The decision level of the target 
- The communication with the target 
- The modalities used to influence the 
target 
- Legal status 
- Listing on stock markets 
- The externalisation of the lobbying 
action 
- The political level of the target 
- The geographical level of the target 
- The length of the action 
- The attitude to the target 
 
 
Lobbying networks in France and the UK: models and comparison 
 
Multivariate data analysis techniques (multiple correspondences analysis and automatic classification) 
are used to model corporate political actions in the French  (510 individuals from 1995 to 2000) and British 
samples (169 individuals for 2000).  
By simultaneously minimising the within-class variance of the data and maximising the between-class 
variance of the data, one can, by construction, define homogeneous classes in a statistical sense whereby 
specific types of lobbying can be defined along them.   
This paper will take significant variables (according to test statistics which are χ2 distributed) to 









































8The French lobbying model 
 
Figure 1. The French lobbying model (1995-2000)   
Results are calculated over the 510 individuals of the sample  































        
 
The data analysis found five classes in the French sample. The average population is 102 individuals 
for each class but corporate political actions are not equally distributed across the five classes : there is a very 
large class (class 2) with 42.2 percent of the sample and a small class (class 4) with 6.3 percent of the sample. 
Some variables seem particularly discriminating in this respect (the classes differing according to the 
modalities of these variables) : general stance of the firm regarding lobbying, and especially general behaviour 
towards public decision makers; the target of the lobbying (the three variables are important but the one most 
significant is the decision level of the target); the lobbyists in practice. By contrast, variables concerning the 
causes the lobbying action and the management of lobbying are less discriminating. Regarding the general 
characteristics of the firms, only the branch of industry may to some extent have a little bearing on the French 
model of lobbying.  
 
Class 3 (Cl 3) with 88 individuals can be called the “international corporate political action type” since 
91.5 percent of international targeted actions belong to this class. The target of the lobbying is really significant 









































8problem is specific too : 100 percent of the political actions with a public relevant issue belong to this class. The 
communication with the target is direct for more than 90 percent of the lobbying actions in this class. 
 
“Hyparlo” Case (10/11/1999) 
The French supermarkets firm “Hyparlo” is a member of a professional business union (the national 
Federation of Trade and Distribution firms) that lobbies the World Trade Organization. Its aim is to defend 
consumers’ food quality standards during the Millennium Round. 
 
Class 1 (Cl 1) with 96 individuals can be called the “European corporate political action type” because 
of the importance of the European  localised target. A specificity has to be underlined here, the relevance of the 
problem is both private and public. Furthermore, another significant mode is the absence of information on the 
issue of the externalisation of the lobbying action. 
 
“Europe 1” Case (30/07/1998) 
The French communication firm “Europe1” has started to lobby the European Commission to lower 
broadcasting costs during the Soccer World Cup of 1998. It operates within the European Broadcasting Union 
to defend at the same time consumers’ and professionals’ rights.  
 
Class 2 and class 5 lobbying actions are both managed at the national level (90 percent of the targets 
are nationally based in class 2 and 80 percent in class 5). As the target is national it mainly acts through 
regulation authorities in both cases. To discriminate further these two classes, other (less significant) variables 
have to be compared. Table 3 shows us the main differences between class 2 and class 5.  
 
Table 3. The French model : a comparison between class 2 and class 5 
Variable  Mode for class 2  Mode for class 5 
General behaviour towards public decision 
makers 
Anticipating and passive  Active 
Frequency of relations with public decision 
makers 
Case by case  Continuous 
The expected result  Minimise a loss 
 
Maximise a gain 
The number of problems to solve  Single Multiple 










































Finally, regarding those differences, class 2 (Cl 2) with its 215 individuals may be called the “national 
and imposed corporate political action type”. 
 
“Canal plus” Case (06/02/1995) 
The French group “Canal Plus” lobbies against the policy of the French Ministry of Communication to 
minimise a loss, in particular regarding regulations related to TV advertising. Indeed, they are different between 
private and public channels.  
  
By contrast, class 5 (Cl 5) with its 79 individuals may be called the “national voluntarist corporate 
political action type”. 
 
“Société Générale” Case (26/03/1997) 
The French Bank “Société Générale” belongs to the Parisian financial markets organization “Paris 
Europlace”. This organization promotes Paris in many dimensions as a financial centre, through active political 
actions on the French government. Members include all categories of players in financial circlese. 
 
Class 4 (Cl 4) with 32 individuals can be called the “local corporate political action type” since 96.9 
percent of the targets in this class are local based. It is strongly linked with a rather “dynamic” general stance 
regarding strategy with an active general behaviour towards public decision makers. The political level of the 
local target is mainly legislative (81.3 percent of the class 4). Within this class, lobbying firms want in general 
to solve multiple issues by a cooperative attitude to the public decision makers.  
 
“Sabaté Diosos” Case (15/11/1995) 
Sabaté Diosos is a small firm located in south of France. It is a member alongside fifteen similar firms 
of a regional lobby. This regional lobby expects local MPs to take action contributing to their economic 









































8The British lobbying model 
 
Figure 2. The British lobbying model (2000) 
  











Non structured action 
















The data analysis found four classes in the British sample. The average population is 42.3 individuals 
for each class but corporate political actions are not equally distributed across the four classes : there is a very 
large class (class 1) with 48.5 percent of the sample and three smaller classes (from 11.8 percent of the sample 
for class 2 to 22.5 percent of the sample for class 3).  
Some variables seem particularly discriminating in this respect (the classes differing according to the 
modalities of these variables): general stance of the firm regarding lobbying, and especially general behaviour 
towards public decision makers; the lobbyists in practice (the type of partnership for the lobbying action as 
much as the externalisation of the lobbying action); the management of lobbying (and especially the 
communication with the target).  
 
Class 1 (Cl 1) with 82 individuals can be called the “European corporate political action type” (95.24 
percent of the European targeted actions belong to this class). A specificity has to be underlined here regarding 
the lobbyists in practice: about 100 percent of the lobbying actions in this class are led by  collective and 









































8an anticipating behaviour and continuous relations with public decision makers. A the target is European it 
often acts through control authorities. Within this class, lobbying firms want in general to solve a single issue 
(to minimise a loss) by an indirect and long run action.  
 
“Vosper Thornycroft” Case (03/11/2000) 
“Vosper Thornycroft” belongs to the Shipbuilders and Shiprepairers Association. Nick Gainger, 
director of the SSA lobbies the European Commission to reprieve national subsidies. He argues that, given a 
temporary reprieve (as little as three years), merchant shipyards could become independent of government 
support. 
 
Class 2, class 3 and class 4 are managed at the national level (100 percent of the targets are nationally 
based in class 2 and in class 4, about 80 percent in class 3).Nevertheless, structured corporate political actions 
(individual or collective) define class 3 whereas structured (and collective) corporate political actions define 
class 2 and 4. 
 
    Class 3 (Cl 3) with 38 individuals can be called the “national and non structured corporate political 
action type” since 86.4percent of individual  actions  and 100 percent of non structured and collective actions 
belong to this class. Finally, about 90 percent of the lobbying actions in this class are non structured actions. 
This type of partnership is strongly linked with an internal lobbyist. Other specificities have to be underlined : 
the relevance of the problem can be public, the targets can be control authorities, the modalities used to 
influence the target can be financial. Furthermore, the short run action is managed directly by pressing the 
target.  
 
“BOC” Case (18/02/2000) 
The UK government considers significant concession on the climate change levy following fierce 
lobbying by big industrial companies that were excluded from a discount deal struck. One of the fiercest 
campaigns is waged by the industrial gas manufacturers “BOC”, “Air Products” and “Messer Griesheim”. Sir 
David John, “BOC”’s chairman has written to Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. 









































8Class 2 and class 4 both belong to the “national and structured corporate political action type”. They 
have other points in common: case by case relations with public decision makers, a private issue that is to 
maximise a gain, a target acting as a regulation authority. To discriminate further these two classes, other (less 
significant) variables have to be compared. Table 4 shows us the main differences between class 2 and class 4. 
 
Table 4. The British model : a comparison between class 2 and class 4 
Variable  Mode for class 2  Mode for class 4 
General behaviour towards public decision makers  Active Passive 
The number of problems to solve  Single Multiple 
The externalisation choice of the lobbyist  External Internal 
The length of the action  Long Short 
The communication with the target  Both Indirect 
 
  Finally, regarding those differences, class 2 (Cl 2) with its 20 individuals may be called the 
“structured and voluntarist corporate political action type” at the national level. 
 
“Eidos Interactive” Case (07/11/2000) 
The British firm “Eidos Interactive” belongs to the “Entertainment and Leisure Software Publishers 
Association” (ELPSA). ELSPA lobbies the UK government to introduce a levy on blank CDs, DVDs, CD 
writers and DVD writers to reduce pirates’ profits. Under ELSPA’s proposals, the funds would be channels 
directly to enforcement agencies, to help them to fight piracy. 
  
By contrast, class 4 (Cl 4) with its 29 individuals may be called the “structured and imposed corporate 
political action type” at the national level. 
 
“Corus” Case (10/11/2000) 
“Corus” is opposed to the UK chancellor’s proposals to revive inner cities, said too limited in scale to 
provide a significant boost to the construction and house building sectors. This UK firm acts within the 
Construction Products Association. The organization tries to solve multiple issues, to build a “growing, 









































8An attempt to compare the French and British lobbying styles : is it a legal or an illegal networking ? 
 
Global comparison of the two models 
 
The geography of corporate political actions of the French and British models differ. On the one hand, 
national actions stands for more than 50 percent in each case. But, on the other, British lobbying actions are 
only managed at the European and national levels while French lobbying actions can reach international or local 
targets too. In Britain, there is absolutely no local action and very few international actions (albeit not enough to 
make a class). As a consequence, there are more European political actions in the British model (48.5 percent) 
than in the French model (18.8 percent). Moreover, the variable “type of partnership for the lobbying action” is 
discriminating enough to be a key characteristic of the British model at the national level (opposing structured 
actions vs. non structured actions) but not in the case of the French model. Furthermore, at the national level, a 
third class can be identified in Britain (and not in France), the “non structured actions”. In French model, non 
structured actions are allocated in two other classes, namely at the international level (40.7percent of individual 
actions and 36.2 percent of non structured collective action) and at the national level (especially in imposed 
actions: 43.8percent of individual actions and 53.2percent of collective and non-structured actions).  
Those differences may be explained by the political history of each country. Lobbying is well-
established in the UK as well as in the European Union. That is why British firms prefer political action at the 
European level which is more similar to their political action at the national level than international or local 
lobbying. Moreover, it is difficult for French firms to lobby without a collective organization since it is more 
difficult for single firms to resort to lobbying alone, which is less recognised in France than in the UK, than  for 
British firms. As a consequence, there is no choice in France as far as partnership type is concerned when it 
comes to lobbying. 
 
Finally, in both countries, at the European and national level, three corporate political action style 
(referred to as “European action”, “voluntarist action” and “imposed action”) stand out. It is worthwhile 
checking further whether they are exactly the same in France and in Britain (see infra.).    
 










































8For most discriminating variables, European corporate political action styles show common features in 
France and in the UK: an anticipating general stance towards public decision makers, with both private and 
public natures of problems, collective and structured actions, indirect communication with the target. We 
studied the cases of “Europe 1” and “Vosper Thornycroft” to illustrate this kind of lobbying.  
These strategic choices are perhaps linked to European institutions. Indeed, the European Commission 
has more input into decision-making since it prepares laws and regulations that are subsequently passed by the 
European Parliament and the Council and, as such, is a better target for lobbyists. At the same time, the 
European Union is opened to lobbyists actions. That is why it is easier for firms to have continuous and active 
relations with European institutions. 
Nevertheless, some (less discriminating) variables differ: the expected result, the externalisation of 
lobbyist action, the attitude of the firm to the target. For example, French firm do not publicly reveal their 
choice of the lobbyist whereas British firms openly use outside lobbyists. That may be linked to the lack of 
legitimacy of lobbying in France.  
 
Comparison of the actions at the national level in the two models 
 
At the national level, a corporate political action of voluntarist type ( illustrated by the “Société 
Générale” and “ Eidos Interactive” cases) has been identified for class 5 in France and class 2 in Britain. In both 
cases, these lobbying styles exhibit an active general behaviour towards public decision makers, to maximise a 
gain , by a collective and structured action. Firms try to reach regulation authorities by both direct and indirect 
ways of communication in the long run. Nevertheless, there are three mains differences between French and UK 
voluntarist lobbying styles. UK corporate political actions are of a case by case nature, led by external lobbyists 
mainly to solve one single issue. On the contrary, French corporate political actions are continuous, led by 
internal lobbyists to solve multiples problems. This feature may be accounted for by the fact that British 
lobbying is more institutionalised than the  French one. 
 
Turning to the imposed corporate political action identified for class 2 in France (“Canal Plus” case”) 
and class 4 in Britain (“Corus” case) a number of points in common can be singled out: a passive (or 
anticipating) general behaviour towards publics decision makers with only case by case relations, structured and 









































8may imply that this kind of lobbying is caused by a lack of firms’ resources but not by differences in national 
political histories.  
Differences exist too. British firms whose lobbying is “imposed” focus on a single issue, to maximise a 
gain via a short run and cooperative action. French firms whose lobbying is “imposed” address multiple issues, 
to minimise a loss, by a long-run and, in half of the cases, pressing action.   
 
Conclusion : is it possible to control lobbying networks ? 
 
To conclude, this paper has modelled corporate political actions of French (1995-2000) and British 
firms (2000). Multivariate data analysis over 679 French and British firms shows that a few kinds of lobbying 
practices exist in each country : five on four geographical levels in France (“international action”, “European 
action”, “national and imposed action”, “national and voluntarist action”, local action”) against four on two 
geographical levels in the UK (“European action”, “national and non structured action”, “national structured 
and imposed action”, “national structured and voluntarist action”). 
Overall, general patterns of lobbying actions are different for French and UK firms but some types of 
lobbying are common: “European action”, “national imposed action” and “national voluntarist action”. This 
may imply that lobbying patterns can be explained by reasons that are more problem-specific than country-
specific. Nevertheless, national specifics exist. We expect to investigate them further by studying more detailed 
cases in the furure. 
 
Looking ahead, it would be interesting to investigate whether these lobbying actions have an impact on 
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